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Hume’s Moral Philosophy 
Sam Rayner 
 
 David Hume postulated that morality may be 
grounded in senses and emotions rather than reason or 
divine will, put forth the origins of much of utilitarian 
thought, and furthered Locke’s empiricism.  Despite his 
achievements, however, one often perceives a great 
disunity in his works sometimes to the point of self-
contradiction.  This contradiction occurs in part because 
of the breadth of philosophy contained in Hume’s 
theorizing.  Writing on Hume, Ronald Glossop notes 
that: “Even within the past few years, articles and books 
have appeared suggesting that his theory should be 
classified as a type of utilitarianism, a type of 
subjectivism, or as a type of qualified or ideal spectator 
theory.”1 
 It is not surprising that disagreement exists 
amongst various critics concerning how to classify 
Hume as a moral philosopher.  Throughout his works 
Hume seems to support many varied philosophical 
doctrines.  There is much in his writing to suggest that 
Hume was a utilitarian; Hume wrote a considerable 
amount on the subject of the utility of morals, and even 
postulated that many forms of morality may be based 
on a form of rule utilitarianism.  At the same time, 
Hume believed that morality arises in individual 
sentiments, which suggests that he may be best 
interpreted as a subjectivist.  Hume, however, also 
discussed the necessity of departing to the frame of 
mind of an impartial spectator in order to make correct 
moral judgments, which contradicts a doctrine of pure 
                                                
1R. Glossop, “The Nature of Hume's Ethics,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 27 (1967): 527-536. 
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subjectivism.  Hume’s writing also displays skeptical 
thought; he questions the notion of causality, and 
debates whether inductive reasoning can consistently 
and truthfully be carried out.  On top of it all, Hume’s 
entire philosophy is empirically based, and therefore 
does not seem to support a normative doctrine such as 
utilitarianism. 
 One question, then, for readers contemplating 
Hume’s writings, is what unified theory (if any) to draw 
from his enquiries.  Many philosophers tend to limit 
Hume to one branch of modern moral philosophy, to 
one specific and formulaic system.  I believe that 
Hume’s writing defies simple categorization into one 
branch of modern philosophy, and that Hume fully 
intended this.  To group Hume’s ideas into one system 
of moral philosophy (i.e. utilitarianism or skepticism) 
forces one to ignore the breadth of his philosophy and 
distort his intended eschewal of overly rigid formalism 
in moral enquiry.2  Rather, Hume’s moral theory is best 
expressed as an amalgamation of several different 
systems of philosophical thought, including those 
mentioned above.  Although syntheses of Hume’s 
moral thought have been previously attempted, as in 
Glossop’s aforementioned article, there is more work to 
be done in order to extract from Hume’s texts a 
properly integrated moral theory.   
In this paper I attempt a distillation of Hume’s 
moral writings into one reasonably cogent and unified 
theory, thoroughly incorporating the disparate 
philosophical ideas that Hume addresses.  To 
accomplish this, I focus mainly on Hume’s A Treatise 
                                                
2For a discussion of the manner in which Hume rejects rigid 
formalism in moral study see:  J. Passmore, Hume’s Intentions, 
(New York: Basic Books Inc. 1952), esp. 152-159. 
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of Human Nature3 and his second Enquiry which, as 
Glossop notes, presents a clearer and less contradictory 
version of the moral ideas he put forth in his Treatise.  
Although some philosophers see the Enquiry as a 
departure from Hume’s earlier thought, I believe that 
Glossop’s assertion of the similar relationship between 
Hume’s Treatise and his second Enquiry is borne out in 
this paper through the arguments and examples which 
are consistently drawn from both works. 
 Hume’s moral philosophy is perhaps best seen 
as the synthesis of four main philosophical ideas: 
empiricism, subjectivism (more specifically 
sentimentalism), impartial spectator theory, and 
utilitarian thought.  Although Hume is often associated 
with skepticism (and a moderate skepticism is evident 
in his epistemological thought) as discussed further on 
in this paper, I do not see Hume as a moral skeptic. 
Empiricism underlies Hume’s entire moral 
philosophy.  Hume is not setting forth a normative 
doctrine but is instead examining moral attitudes, 
sentiments, and beliefs from an empirical standpoint.  
Describing the empirical nature of Hume’s moral 
enquiry, Mackie says of the Treatise that:  “. . . it is an 
attempt to study and explain moral phenomena (as well 
as human knowledge and emotions) in the same way in 
which Newton and his followers studied and explained 
the physical world.”4  The empiricism of Hume’s moral 
thought is most readily seen in the famous passage on 
                                                
3David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge 
(London:  Oxford University Press, 1967). Hereafter referred to 
simply as the Treatise. 
 
4 J. L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd, 1980), 6.  Also see Passmore’s aforementioned 
work for a relation of Hume’s empirical thought to Newton’s 
scientific inquiry.  
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page 469 of the Treatise from which what R. M. Hare 
has called “Hume’s Law” is derived: 
 
In every system of morality I have hitherto met with, 
I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for 
some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and 
establishes the being of a God, or makes 
observations concerning human affairs; when of a 
sudden I am supriz’d to find, that instead of the 
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I 
meet with no proposition other than ought or ought 
not.  This change is imperceptible; but is, however, 
of the last consequence.  For as this ought or ought 
not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis 
necessary that it should be observe’d and explain’d; 
and at the same time a reason should be given, for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it.  But as authors do not 
commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to 
recommend it to the readers;  and am persuaded that 
this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar 
systems of morality, and let us see, that the 
distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely 
on the relations of objects, nor is perceive’d by 
reason. 
 
“Hume’s Law” as Hare calls it, is the idea that a moral 
imperative (an ought) cannot proceed from a factual 
observation (an is).5  This sets the stage for Hume’s 
moral philosophy in which he postulates that morality 
must be grounded in innately moral sentiments, rather 
                                                
5 The correct interpretation of this passage has long been under 
debate, and some critics dispute whether “Hume’s Law” is actually 
to be derived from his writing.  While I disagree, this side of the 
debate is important to note.  See, for example:  A. C. MacIntyre, 
“Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’” The Philosophical Review, 4 (1959): 
451-468. 
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than following from non-moral objects, such as reason.  
It also reflects the empiricism of his discussion on 
virtue and vice; he is simply reporting what causes 
moral sentiments without proclaiming there to be 
normative truths in actions themselves. 
Hume makes the point that the only place that 
morality can be found is in our sentiments, as he 
believes that there is no morality in objects or actions 
themselves.  Therefore we cannot be motivated to act 
morally through reason alone, because reason is only 
concerned with determining truths about objects already 
existing in the world.  This point is made throughout his 
writings, and is explained well in the beginning of his 
second Enquiry when, speaking of “inferences and 
conclusions of the understanding,” Hume states: 
They discover truths: But where the truths 
which they discover are indifferent and beget no desire 
or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct and 
behaviour.  What is honourable, what is fair, what is 
becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes 
possession of the heart, and animates us to embrace and 
maintain it.  What is intelligible, what is evident, what 
is probable, what is true, produce only the cool assent 
of the understanding . . . extinguish all the warm 
feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue, and all 
disgust or aversion to vice: Render men totally 
indifferent towards those distinctions; and morality is 
no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to 
regulate our lives and actions.6      
In his second Enquiry Hume does allow reason 
some importance in morality, in that his Enquiry 
explicitly ascribes to reason both the role of 
                                                
6David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, ed. 
Eric Steinberg (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 1983), 
15.  Hereafter referred to as ECPM. 
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determining the nature of an object, and deciding how 
to best achieve something desired by the passions.  Yet 
this does not represent a departure from his earlier 
thought, as some critics ascertain.  Indeed, in his 
Treatise Hume expresses nearly the same idea, although 
in less detail, by stating:  
 
Thus upon the whole ‘tis impossible, that the 
distinction betwixt moral good and evil, can be made 
by reason; since that distinction has an influence on 
our actions, of which reason alone is incapable.  
Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate 
cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a 
passion. . .7   
 
Hume sees what he calls sympathy as the underlying 
foundation of the interpersonal nature of human 
morality.  By sympathy Hume is referring to the human 
ability to convey our moral sentiments to one another 
and, upon observing the outward effects of someone 
else’s internal moral sentiments, our ability to actually 
feel those sentiments as though they were our own.  On 
page 319 of his Treatise Hume states: 
 
‘Tis indeed evident, that when we sympathize with 
the passions and sentiments of others, these 
movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, 
and are conceiv’d to belong to another person, as we 
conceive any other matter of fact.  ‘Tis also evident, 
that the ideas of the affections of others are 
converted into the very impressions they represent, 
and that the passions arise in conformity to the 
images we form of them. 
  
                                                
7See the Treatise, 462 
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Hume tempers the above ideas by adding the necessity 
of judging morality from the standpoint of an impartial 
observer.  Hume believes that in order to make 
consistent moral judgments a human must move to an 
imaginary and impersonal frame of mind.  On this topic, 
Hume states:   
 
When a man denominates another his enemy, his 
rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood 
to speak the language of self-love, and to express 
sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his 
particular circumstances and situation.  But when he 
bestows upon any man the epithets of vicious, or 
odious, or depraved, he then speaks another 
language, and expresses sentiments, in which, he 
expects, all his audience are to concur with him.  He 
must here, therefore, depart from his private and 
particular situation, and must choose a point of view, 
common to him with others: He must move to some 
universal principle. . . 8 
 
It is difficult to reconcile the fact that elsewhere in his 
writings Hume asserts the subjectivism of each 
human’s moral sentiments, with this seemingly 
diametric idea of a “universal principle” as stated in the 
passage above.  It is my interpretation that Hume 
believes that humans are naturally uniform to some 
degree in their perception of moral sentiments.  
Through sympathy moral sentiments are communicated, 
and the sentiments of others can be felt and perceived.  
In cases where one’s morality is clouded by his 
proximity to a matter, Hume believes he must imagine 
the moral sentiment of an impersonal observer.  
Through sympathy this sentiment can then be adopted 
                                                
8 ECPM, 75.  For the expression of the same ideas in the Treatise, 
see 577, 581, 582. 
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by him as his own, and he will be able to make a correct 
moral judgment.  In a similar line of reasoning, Glossop 
makes a very relevant distinction between moral 
sentiments and moral judgments.  Glossop states that 
sentiments arise from actual sympathy, and by 
correcting them through reflecting on them with an 
imagined impartiality we can attempt to make 
appropriate moral judgments, by adopting the 
sentiments afforded by the resultant ideal sympathy.9 
 Hume believes that although morality arises 
from sentiments, by determining commonalities in the 
nature of the sentiments that give us approbation, we 
can induce general principles of morality.  From this, 
according to Hume, one can plainly see that often the 
moral sentiments which cause us approbation are those 
that are useful to us or to society.  Utilitarian tendencies 
in Hume’s thoughts are ubiquitous; his second Enquiry, 
especially, is peppered throughout with words such as 
“useful,” and “utility,” often italicized or capitalized.  
Yet, Hume’s pseudo-utilitarianism differs from typical 
utilitarian thought in that Hume does not believe that 
utility imparts a moral ought to us.  The difference 
between Hume’s utilitarian thought and the 
utilitarianism of his successors such as Bentham or Mill, 
is that Hume’s utilitarianism is empirical rather than 
normative:  Hume does not hold that we ought to do 
what is useful to society (as a true utilitarian would), 
rather he simply notes that in most cases that which 
causes us moral sentiments of approbation happens to 
be that which is useful.  Utilitarianism then is not true 
by definition; it is something that we induce to be true, 
empirically, due to the nature our sentiments.   
Hume’s descriptions of morality describe a sort 
of empirical rule utilitarianism in that he explains, 
                                                
9See the Treatise, Footnote 1, 530. 
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especially in areas of justice, that following a rule that 
in general is of great utility to mankind will give us 
sentiments of approbation even if in particular instances 
it does not impart any great usefulness to us.10  Hume 
distinguishes in many cases between “natural virtues” 
and artificial virtues such as justice (which are creations 
of man), by relating natural virtues to act utilitarianism, 
and artificial virtues (especially justice) to rule 
utilitarianism saying: 
 
The only difference betwixt the natural virtues and 
justice lies in this, that the good, which results from 
the former, arises from every single act, and is the 
object of some natural passion: Whereas a single act 
of justice, consider’d in itself may often be contrary 
to the public good; and ‘tis only the concurrence of 
mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, 
which is advantageous.11   
 
One can easily accept Hume’s seemingly utilitarian 
leanings along with the rest of his philosophy because 
Hume simply shows, empirically, that utility reflects a 
pattern in which of our sentiments give us moral 
pleasure and in no case advocates a normative doctrine 
based on utilitarian thought. 
                                                
10See page 36 of ECPM where Hume states: “general rules are 
often extended beyond the principle. . .” 
11Treatise, 579.  Though Hume speaks of some virtues as 
“artifices of man,” such as justice in this case, he explains that this 
is an instance of man using his reason to determine how best to 
achieve a moral end.  Hume states that politics, law, justice, and 
other human artifices and virtues are essentially man’s attempt to 
achieve moral sentiments of approbation in a logical way.  The use 
of logic, however, does not change the fact that the sentiments of 
approbation it seeks lie in man’s innate nature and not in his reason.     
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 Hume’s ideas are also often associated with 
skepticism.  Indeed Hume’s overall philosophy is one 
of moderate epistemological skepticism as Fogelin 
points out. 12   Fogelin asserts that Hume questions 
whether our inductive inferences have rational grounds 
to support them, but that Hume believes that the 
inductions that we make are conceptually valid if we 
reduce our knowledge to the level of probabilities.  
Hume suggests that we as humans will never fully 
understand the basis for all human knowledge, and to 
move forward in any philosophical thought we must 
presuppose certain facts, such as constancy in nature.  
At the very least, he suggests, not being able to provide 
a basis for our inductions should not preclude us from 
philosophy. 
 Though Hume is a moderate epistemic skeptic, 
his moral writings tend towards subjectivism rather 
than outright skepticism.  More specifically, Hume’s 
position has been termed “sentimentalism” because he 
believes that morality arises from human sentiments.  
Hume firmly states this position in many areas of this 
treatise, such as when he says “When you pronounce 
any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, 
but that from the constitution of your nature you have a 
feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of 
it.”13  Quotes such as this lead one to believe that Hume 
is rejecting realism by advocating a view that actions or 
objects themselves do not have morality as an attribute.  
                                                
12R. Fogelin, Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature, 
(London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1985), 2, 6, 123.  It is 
important for me to point out, however, that Fogelin believes 
Hume to be much more skeptical than most critics, he ascribes a 
pyrrhoian skepticism to Hume.  For the purposes of this paper I 
regard Hume only as a moderate epistemological skeptic.    
13 Treatise, 469 
 16 
Hume’s rejection of a realist account of morality is 
stated almost explicitly a few pages earlier in the 
treatise when, after proclaiming that morality is 
derivative from sentiments or passions, Hume goes on 
to deny passions true/false validity: 
 
Now ‘tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, 
are not susceptible of any such agreement; being 
original facts and realities, complete in 
themselves . . . ‘Tis impossible therefore that they 
can be pronounced either true or false, and be either 
contrary or conformable to reason.14    
 
 Mackie, in his aforementioned text, having 
concluded from similar passages of the treatise that 
Hume’s philosophy is best categorized as subjective 
sentimentalism, attempts to further classify Hume’s 
philosophy as one of four branches of sentimentalism:  
Emotivism, Dispositional Descriptivism, Prescriptivism, 
or what Mackie calls “The Objectification theory.”  Of 
the first three Emotivism is the most relevant to Hume’s 
writings, and Hume has often been referred to in critical 
works as an Emotivist.  Emotivism, according to 
Mackie, is the belief that “a moral statement expresses, 
rather than reports, a sentiment which the speaker 
purports to have, and, by expressing it, tends to 
communicate it to a suitable hearer.”  Critics such as 
Stroud and Mackie, however, reject Hume as an 
Emotivist citing what they see as the obvious 
contradiction of Emotivist theory with other areas of 
Hume’s writing.15  They argue that because so much of 
what we say when reasoning morally is comparable to 
                                                
14Treatise, 458 
15See: B. Stroud, Hume, (London: Routledge & Keagen Paul, 
1977), 182, 184. 
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what we say when making true or false designations it 
is illogical to believe that we are only expressing our 
feelings.  They hold that Hume recognizes that moral 
language is spoken of in true or false terms, and 
therefore he could not have intended an Emotivist 
philosophy without gross contradiction.  I agree with 
Stroud and Mackie in that I view Emotivism as innately 
fallacious and at odds with other areas of Hume’s 
writing, and I cannot believe that Hume intended to put 
forth any sort of Emotivist doctrine.  Speaking of 
Emotivism Stroud points out on page 182 of his work 
that:  
 
There is no evidence that Hume even considered any 
such theory.  He thinks of a moral conclusion or 
verdict as a ‘pronouncement’ or judgment – 
something put forward as true.  Of course, his 
considered view is that moral judgments are not 
literally true of anything in the action in question. . . 
 
 The above passage segues nicely into what I 
consider to be the correct interpretation of Hume’s 
sentimentalism.  Stroud purports that perhaps Hume is 
saying that while we are making objective claims, there 
is no objectivity in the object or action itself.  We as 
humans objectify what is unobjective. . . we impart 
objectivity to actions and objects due to the sentiments 
we have and the nature of our humanity.  This is 
embellished in Mackie’s book into what he has termed 
“The Objectification theory,” which is very similar to 
Mackie’s Error Theory simply reworded and applied to 
Hume.  In accordance with Stroud’s ideas, Mackie’s 
theory holds that Hume believes we state moral claims 
as though morality was a matter of cognitive true/false 
statements, although in reality it is not, and there is no 
true or false to be discerned in moral actions or objects 
themselves.  Mackie’s argument is made all the more 
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convincing when one examines Hume’s writings, such 
as the following passage which is quoted by Mackie: 
 
Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason 
and of taste are easily ascertained.  The former 
conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood:  The 
latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, 
vice and virtue.  The one discovers objects as they 
really stand in nature, without addition or diminution:  
The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or 
straining all natural objects with the colours, 
borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner 
a new creation.16  
 
This passage shows Hume relating the perception of 
“vice and virtue” to “taste,” and expresses the idea that 
while reason shows us objects as they really are, by 
combining our perception of objects through reason 
with the moral sentiments afforded us by “taste,” 
humans assign moral properties (falsely) to amoral 
objects and actions.   
 Mackie’s interpretation does not drive Hume 
into skepticism, though it does show him to be a 
subjectivist as well as an antirealist.  In the above 
interpretation, Hume is skeptical only in the sense that 
he doesn’t accept that moral values are, in actuality, 
true or false statements of fact, and thus also cannot 
accept that moral values are immutable laws existing 
outside of the human condition.  Hume still holds, 
however, that some degree of objectivity is imparted to 
actions and objects through the human sentiments that 
we have about them: 
 
Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than 
our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and 
                                                
16 Page 72 of Mackie’s book, the quote is from Hume’s appendix 
to ECPM 
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if these be favorable to virtue, and unfavorable to 
vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of 
our conduct and behavior.17 
 
Therefore, though morality does not in and of itself 
consist of true or false statements, humans attempt to 
describe morality in true or false terms in accordance 
with how much pleasure we derive from our “virtues,” 
or how much uneasiness from our “vices.”  Thus, while 
there is no objective true or false in the nature of 
morality itself, human perceptions of moral sentiments 
impart a true and false reasoning to non-objective 
phenomena.  In this way Hume can be portrayed, in a 
way, as accepting normative values within the confines 
of our humanity, and his skepticism towards realist 
thought is easily reconciled with the rest of his moral 
theory.   
 While I accept and admire much of Mackie’s 
analysis of Hume’s moral theory, I disagree with 
Mackie’s classification of Hume as a non-cognitivist, 
because Hume (by Mackie’s own admittance) 
recognizes that moral statements are put forth with the 
intention of making a true or false designation.  
Whether morality in actuality is a matter of true or false, 
or simply approval and disapproval (as Hume believes) 
does not change the fact that the language used by 
humans to analyze our moral sentiments is cognitive in 
nature.  Hume’s recognizance of the true or false nature 
of moral statements makes him a cognitivist regardless 
of what he may say about the actual lack of morality in 
objects or actions themselves.   
 If one adjusts Mackie’s interpretation by 
considering Hume to be a cognitivist as well as an 
“Objectification theorist”, a powerful argument can be 
                                                
17 Treatise, 469 
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derived from Hume’s writing.  This is because Hume’s 
subjectivism is tempered by his idea of the 
communication of sentiments through sympathy, and 
his idea (as stated by Glossop) of the possibility of 
correcting our sentiments into moral judgments by 
adopting the sympathy of an impersonal spectator.  
Such tempered subjectivism is powerful because it 
explains the essentially personal nature of human moral 
sentiments while allowing for a standard of morality 
across humankind.  Interpreting Hume as an 
“Objectification theorist” as well as a cognitivist, 
allows Hume to avoid the pitfalls of Emotivism, 
Prescriptivism, or Descriptivism because such an 
interpretation explains the fact that moral statements 
represent an attempt to judge actions and objects in 
declarative terms. 
 To recapitulate my argument, to attempt to bring 
Hume’s ideas on morality into a cogent whole one 
could make the following points:  (1) While a rational 
basis for accepting morality may not be possible to find, 
if we accept reasoning within the confines of human 
limitations, we can act on and discuss morality.  (2) 
Morality arises from sentiments which are subjective, 
yet we communicate our sentiments through sympathy 
and by appealing to the imagined sympathy of an 
impersonal observer, we can utilize a standard of 
morality and make moral judgments.  (3) Examining 
empirically which moral sentiments give us approbation, 
we can see that most often, that which is moral is that 
which has utility to us or other humans, and in cases 
where utility is not immediately apparent it is often the 
rule itself which is useful to humanity and thus gives us 
sentiments of approbation.  (4) To be human means to 
see the world in terms of morality, thus we impart 
objectivity to objects and actions that are unobjective 
outside of our human nature.   Nevertheless moral 
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arguing is valid within the confines of what it means to 
be human.    
 The above interpretation of Hume is certainly 
not the only one possible.  The nature of what Hume 
intends is still hotly contested even today, and much of 
what Hume says is contradicted in the wording of other 
passages.  Hume introduces a broad range of ideas, 
sometimes with remarkable lack of regard for 
continuity.  Passmore regards this breadth of enquiry as 
one of Hume’s major accomplishments: 
 
Hume’s achievement, then, must be diversely 
described; his philosophy will not fit neatly with any 
of the ordinary categories.  He is pre-eminently a 
breaker of new ground: A philosopher who opens up 
new lines of thought, who suggests to us an endless 
variety of philosophical explorations.  No one could 
be a Humean, in the sense in which he could be a 
Hegelian; to be a Humean, precisely, is to take no 
system as final, nothing as ultimate except the spirit 
of enquiry. 
 
I assert, however, that just as we should not ignore the 
breadth of Hume’s philosophy and attempt to confine 
him to one philosophical system, the fact that Hume’s 
doesn’t fit rigid categories of modern philosophical 
thought does not force us to reduce Hume’s writings 
merely to the “spirit of enquiry.”  While one must 
appreciate the active enquiry of Humean thought and 
the progress Hume made against rigid formalism, I 
propose that it is still possible to find a unity in his 
work and to extract a powerful moral argument.  
